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MICROFINANCE AND WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT 
AN EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IN VIETNAM 
by 
Anh Phuoc Thien Nguyen 
University of New Hampshire, May 2018 
 
The study measures an impact of microfinance on women’s empowerment with a case 
study on TYM Funds, a Vietnamese microfinance program initiated by Vietnam’s Women 
Union. The purpose of the study is to examine whether microfinance participants are more 
empowered than non-members, and whether membership duration enhances the degree of 
empowerment among the clients. The author constructs the empowerment indices based on three 
subdimensions: Economic Security, Household Major Decision, and Community Involvement. 
The empirical data is built on TYM Funds’ impact assessment survey, which was conducted on 
544 women including in-training clients, new clients and mature clients. A logistic regression 
model is used to analyze the data. It is found that microfinance members are overall significantly 
more empowered than non-members in every dimension, but there is little evidence to 
corroborate the monotonous relationship between membership duration and the degree of 
empowerment among the mature clients. Also, it is found that higher score in the empowerment 
indices is partially influenced by the number of household members who earn regular income, 





1. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
Women’s empowerment has been one of the United Nation’s eight Millennium 
Development Goals which seek to “combat poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, environmental 
degradation, and discrimination against women” (“MDGs”, n.d.). Comprehensive women’s 
advancement in every aspect of life is viewed as an imperative call since not only it is by nature 
that men and women should have equal status, opportunities, and rights; but also, empowering 
women is a starting point to achieve gender equity at national level and improve the well-being 
of the whole society. Although the mandate of improving women’s social and economic 
presence has been listed in many countries’ agenda, in many developing and underdeveloped 
regions, this segment is still underrated and somewhat suppressed by the surrounding patriarchal 
system. On one hand, it is the government that should be responsible, though sometimes 
unexcited, to impose legal framework to improve gender relations and promote gender equality. 
On the other hand, this responsibility has been partially conferred to microfinance as the sector is 
believed to play an important role in boosting economic dependency for women and enable them 
to gain greater social capital (Ackerly, 1995; Sujatha & Malyadri, 2015). Thus, it is not unusual 
to see microfinance as a platform to elevate women’s social standing relative to their male 
counterparts, and such ability to facilitate women’s advancement in either domestic or social 
sphere has also been considered as one of a microfinance institution’s (MFI) successes as well.   
Vietnam is one of a few developing countries that are eager to comply with the UN’s 
gender development agenda by establishing legal framework to promote gender equality and 
women’s advancement (Schuler et al., 2006). The role of improve women’s status nationwide 
has been conferred to Vietnam Women’s Union (VWU), which is the country’s Communist 




Although VWU has long been organizing discrete, informal micro-lending programs in rural 
regions, it was not until 1992 that it decided to establish a large-scale, registered microfinance 
program called TYM Funds to serve rural Vietnamese women.  
Since previous studies only focused on the VWU itself instead of TYM Funds, and since 
there is a scarcity in the literature regarding measuring the degree of empowerment among 
Vietnamese microfinance clients as well, the purpose of this study is to examine whether 
microfinance participants are significantly more empowered that non-members, and whether 
membership duration enhances the degree of empowerment after joining the program. The study 
will use the TYM Funds as a case study and after this evaluation, it is hoped that the result will 
help to answer to what extent microfinance has fulfilled the Party’s commitment in promoting 
gender equality in Vietnam, as well as to suggest an improvement in TYM Funds’ operation.   
To quantify the degree of empowerment, the study will construct the women’s 
empowerment index based on three dimensions: Economic Security, Household Major Decision, 
and Community Involvement. The data employed in this exercise is derived from TYM’s 2007 
AIMS/SEEP Impact Assessment Survey conducted on its 544 clients. Through this quantitative 
exercise, I will attempt to answer two following questions:  
(i) Does a participation in a microfinance program help empower women economically 
and socially?  
(ii) Does the duration of membership further enhance the degree of empowerment among 
microfinance clients?   
The paper’s structure will be as followed: Section 2 is a literature review which discusses 




choosing the control group in an impact assessment, Section 3 presents the methodology, Section 
4 summaries the descriptive statistics, Section 5 discusses the regression results, Section 6 
concludes and wraps up main findings, and Section 7 will suggest some improvement for future 
study design.      
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Defining empowerment 
As gender equality and social advancement of women worldwide have become a part of 
global development goal, it is necessary to construct a formal definition of women’s 
empowerment and in what circumstances empowerment should be recognized. One noteworthy 
comment from previous studies is that empowerment is not an end point, but it is a process in 
which power is accumulated and emphasized over time (Bennet, 2002; Kabeer, 1999; Kabeer, 
2005; Malhotra et al., 2002). Here, power should be exercised “from below” and carried out by 
an individual (Malhotra et al., 2002, p.5). In other words, while a systemic, institutional changes 
of the surrounding environment is necessary to sustain empowerment, it is not sufficient to assert 
that women have indeed gain their authority and relational power compared to men. One is 
considered empowered when she is able to “acquire the power to act freely, exercise their rights, 
and fulfill their potential as full and equal members of the society” (USAID, 2012, p.3). 
The discussion of empowerment brings about a discourse of the difference between 
gender equality, gender equity, and women’s empowerment, although these terms all exhibit an 
advancement of women’s status. Gender equality refers to a concept that men and women are 
entitled to the freedom of choice and personality development without any impediment generated 
from “stereotypes, rigid gender roles and prejudices” (UNESCO, 2000). It admits that there are 




no gender discrimination toward their rights, opportunities, and responsibilities. The second 
concept, gender equity, relates to a practical implication of gender equality in real life. It could 
be achieved through a fair treatment to both men and women, by enacting some measures and 
strategies to ensure that all human beings are having a level playing field (UNESCO, 2000). 
Thus, by these definitions, gender equality is an end goal while gender equity is a mean to 
achieve that status.  
While gender equity and women’s empowerment both refer to a process of improving 
women’s status, it should be noted that gender equity is usually done by some “external forces” 
such as government or an institution which get involved in issuing a protection and promotion of 
women’s rights (Malhotra et al., 2002). On the other hand, empowerment emanates from an 
individual herself who is able to recognize her rights and opportunities; as well as to freely make 
“strategic life choices” (Kabeer, 2005, p.14) that she was used to be deprived of. Strategic life 
choices refer to those that significantly contribute to one’s life consequences such as whether to 
marry, to choose her own husband, to have children, to send her children to school or to send 
them to hospital for a formal medical treatment. These choices should be “seen to exist” (Kabeer, 
2005, p.14), or viable, since there are cases that women assume their submissive role and 
insignificance, hence suppress themselves from available choices such as initiating a divorce or 
defying her husband’s abuse (Garikipati, 2013; Goetz & Gupta, 1996; Schuler et al., 2006).  
It is noteworthy that sometimes, asking a woman a yes/no question regarding whether she 
has exercised such major decision-making process is insufficient to decide that she is 
empowered. For instance, if it is known that she has taken her child for immunizations in the last 
six months, further questions should be extended to determine if she did initiate this idea or she 




sign of “genuine” empowerment only when she really realizes the long-term benefits of having 
her children immunized, and she has already weighted all the possible opportunity costs in terms 
of time and forgone money she could have earned (Santillan et al., 2004).  
Through this example, it is shown that empowerment itself is a multidimensional concept 
and it requires a careful examination to interpret the purpose of one’s life choices. Following 
that, empowerment is divided into three following dimensions: outcome, agency, resources 
(Kabeer, 1999; Kabeer, 2005). Considering the example above, bringing children for 
immunization would indicate a favorable outcome but a further examination of her motivation 
belongs to agency dimension. In other words, outcome represents an observable achievement of 
a woman that she did not enjoy in the past. This dimension ranges widely from household level 
such as she is now having her own income-generating activity, legal claim on household assets, 
or being able to venture outside without husband’s permission; to community level such as she is 
now actively participating in community activities or holding a leadership role in women union. 
On the other hand, agency dimension emphasizes women’s “sense of self-worth” and requires 
women to be actors of their own actions; that is, every decision should convey a “meaning, 
motivation, and purpose” (Kabeer, 2005, p.14).  
The last dimension, resources, is a medium in which outcome is achieved. This could be 
seen as a “catalyst” (Malhotra et al., 2002, p.8) for empowerment to materialize and is usually 
measured through women’s ability to have access to credits, healthcare, education, or 
employment. For instance, an increasing amount of loan disbursed to rural women or an 
improved attendance rate among female students could represent a resource for empowerment in 
general; however, it is risky to assume that empowerment is guaranteed by simply relying on 




example of promoting educational outcomes among rural girls, while it is a sign that girls should 
have an equal opportunity as boys to have access to knowledge, it is still unsure that whether 
girls are treated fairly by teachers in class compared to boys or if the teaching curricula have 
stopped disseminating gender stereotypes or not (Kabeer, 2005). 
Through a discussion about different dimensions of empowerment, it could be seen that 
the two domains, achievement and resources, are limited in telling if a woman is truly 
empowered as they largely rely on some assumptions prior to the study and data inferences. 
However, it does not mean that any attempts to measure empowerment through these two 
dimensions are futile, since it is impossible to capture the full dynamics of women’s domestic 
and social life. Also, there is time constraint and budget limitation that prevent a meticulous 
study from being implemented. Since resources and achievement domains are easier to measure 
through surveys and secondary data, it is still appropriate to use the two dimensions, especially 
the outcome domain, as empowerment’s proxies. Indeed, as Section 2.3 will present, a common 
approach in previous studies when linking microfinance and women’s empowerment is to use 
outcomes generated from credit programs to quantify the degree of empowerment among the 
clients.  
2.2. Microfinance and women’s empowerment 
Microfinance, in its simplest explanation, is a provision of credits and other ancillary 
financial services for the poor who do not access to formal banking system (Sujatha & Malyadri, 
2015). Initiated by Professor Muhammad Yunus in the 1970s and later sprung to huge popularity 
in the following decades, it has been considered as an effective tool for poverty alleviation as 
well as financial inclusion for the poor and unbanked (Hossain, 1988; Rosenberg, 2009). 




incorporate other services such as savings, microinsurance, micro-scholarship, as well as 
financial and nonfinancial trainings into its operation, thus evolving into a comprehensive, pro-
poor financial sector.  
A majority of microfinance institutions’ (MFIs) customers are female, who comprise of 
92% of total borrowers in South Asia, the world’s largest microfinance market (Khamar, 2016). 
Although a focus on women as credits recipients is not a strange approach nowadays, in the last 
century this idea was indeed abnormal as this countered the prevalent social and gender norms 
dominating many countries’ patriarchal system. In Bangladesh, microfinance’s home country, 
the 1980s had seen a building pressure from supporters of gender-related development agenda as 
well as from international donors to shift the focus on rural women’s financial inclusion (Goetz 
& Gupta, 1996). Women, as they argued, would be benefited from credits provision by investing 
the money in income-generating activities, microenterprises, as well as their household’s long-
term well-being. Thus, promoting women’s incomes should “improve the unique livelihood 
enhancement functions women perform for their households as brokers of the health, nutritional, 
and educational status of other household members” (Goetz & Gupta, 1996, p.46).      
It should be noted that promoting women’s empowerment is not every MFIs’ “guiding 
goal” (Ackerly, 1995, p.56), as some of them, notably Yunus’ Grameen Bank, only take a 
minimalist approach toward its operation. “Minimalist” credit programs, as opposed to those 
with holistic approach, primarily provide credits with little nonfinancial trainings and as in the 
case of Grameen Bank, its guiding goal is to have a “profitable lending to the rural poor on a 
large scale” rather than to directly empower their clients (Ackerly, 1995; Goetz & Gupta, 1996; 
Hashemi et al., 1996). One example of a holistic approach is that of BRAC, which offers women 




social awareness raising, as well as literacy trainings. However, it does not mean that clients 
would reap more benefits from holistic programs such as BRAC since some studies have shown 
that women are also empowered in minimalist program as well (Goetz & Gupta, 1996; Hashemi 
et al., 1996). Overall, regardless of what direction an MFI is aiming at, empowerment has started 
to be perceived as microfinance program’s “presumed” result (Ackerly, 1995).  
2.3. Measuring microfinance’s impact on empowerment 
Choosing the proxy for empowerment is a controversial task among researchers, and the 
result tends to vary greatly when changing from one dimension (outcome) to another dimension 
(agency). Initially, empowerment was associated with clients’ high repayment rates and their 
continued demand for new loans, with an assumption that these increasing demands indicated 
that women had effectively utilized the money for her income-generating activities (Goetz & 
Gupta, 1996). This approach also made a bold assumption that money should be fully retained in 
the recipients’ hands, which is unrealistic since household is a “joint venture” so that it is 
impossible for money to be solely kept by wives. Moreover, high repayment rates do not 
necessarily signify an effective allocation of resources as it could be due to borrowers’ desire to 
remain in the credit program as it is one of the few institutions that they are allowed to join in 
(Goetz & Gupta, 1996).  
In the following years, a common approach to measure the degree of empowerment is to 
build a proxy or index based on the outcomes generated after joining an institution. It could be 
either a cross-sectional study in which control group are nonborrowers living in the same 
community chosen by stratified random sampling (Hashemi et al., 1996, Sahu, 2015; Sultana & 
Hasan, 2011), or new borrowers who are still in the first loan cycle (Weber & Ahmad, 2014), or 




intervention (Al-Mamun et al., 2014; Dineen & Le, 2015; Sujatha & Malyadri, 2015). Although 
it has been proposed in these cross-sectional studies that the treatment and control groups should 
have “similar socioeconomic profile” (Sujatha & Malyadri, 2015), there are some intrinsic issues 
that are not netted out by random selection alone and thus would distort the true impact of the 
credit programs. The discussion regarding this selection bias will be presented in the next 
section.  
Sultana and Hasan (2011) captured only the economic aspect of empowerment when 
studying BRAC’s microfinance program in Bangladesh by measuring three items: personal 
annual income, savings, and assets ownership. Each item was evaluated based on the imputed, or 
estimated amount that a respondent possessed. The study considered both cash and noncash 
savings, as well as farm and nonfarm annual income when computing the estimated value for 
each item. They found that BRAC members had significantly higher level of economic 
empowerment than nonmembers. However, the study was based on a quite small sample size, in 
which only 90 women were involved in the survey and half of them (45 people) belonged to the 
control group.    
For a comprehensive study covering different aspects of empowerment, Hashemi, 
Schuler, and Riley (1996) used eight indicators to construct the index, including: mobility, 
economic security, ability to make small purchases, ability to make large purchases, involvement 
in major decisions, relative freedom from domination by the family, political and legal 
awareness, and participation in public protests and political campaigning. The survey was 
conducted in late 1992 on 1,300 married women who were divided into four groups: Grameen 
Bank (GB)’s members, BRAC’s members, nonmembers living in the same villages, and 




participation in credit programs did empower women, no matter whether it took a minimalist 
(GB) or holistic approach (BRAC). However, each approach affected differently on the 
empowerment dimensions, in which GB’s members were more empowered than those of BRAC 
in terms of economic security and ability to make small and large purchases; while BRAC’s 
members did better on mobility and legal/political awareness. It was also found that women’s 
contribution to family support alone played a significant role on the possibility of being 
empowered, regardless of whether they were participating in the credit programs.  
Contrary to Hashemi et al. (1996), Sujatha and Matyadri (2015) and Al-Mamun et al. 
(2014) proposed that participation in credit programs alone with minimal training did not lead to 
an increase in empowerment; instead, some features commonly seen in holistic programs such as 
literacy and numeric training, regular seminars, and workshop did play an important role in 
enhancing women’s status. They also found a significant improvement in women’s economic 
security, household decision making, legal awareness, and mobility after joining microfinance 
programs, which was consistent with the results from Hashemi et al. (1996) and Sultana and 
Hasan (2011). However, Al-Mamun and colleagues (2014) noted that while women gained more 
control on small purchases such as clothes or food, they still relied on their husband when it 
came to major purchases. This implied the nature of gender division of household roles between 
spouses, in which women are assumed to be responsible for household daily consumption and 
necessities, while large, decisive purchases are culturally under men’s control (Goetz and Gupta, 
1996).  
It should be noted that both Sujatha and Matyadri (2015) and Al-Mamun et al. (2014) 
found that personal savings did not change after taking part in microfinance program. The reason 




to more household spending and more resources spent on daily expenditure. However, this poses 
another question regarding the continued high pressure on women as a contributor to family 
support that consequently appropriates all the additional income they have earned. It seems that 
the cultural status quo relating women as family’s caregiver remains the same and there is not 
any sign indicating that there is a redistribution of the shares between spouses regarding 
household budget management. This suggests that an increase in women’s income does not 
necessarily imply a change in intra-household gender division which is in favor of the wives and 
thus, the assumed role of women as family’s sole contributor could have been unchallenged at 
all.    
Sahu (2015), in a study of Self-Help Group (SHG) in India, also constructed similar 
indicators to that of Hashemi and colleagues. In fact, he was largely influenced by their works 
that he incorporated most of their empowerment dimensions into his analysis (except 
political/legal awareness), and used dummy variables to classify respondents into “empowered” 
and “lacking empowerment”. Apart from Hashemi et al. (1996)’s indicators, Sahu (2015) added 
women’s self-confidence, autonomy, and their perception regarding public interaction with 
officials, health workers, or bankers into empowerment index. He found that SHG’s members 
were more empowered than nonmembers in every indicator, except the autonomy domain which 
was determined by asking whether she could decide (individually or jointly with husband) the 
number of children she wanted to have. In other words, participating in SHGs did not guarantee 
that a woman could participate in the decision-making process related to childbearing issues. 
Moreover, although membership duration improved women’s economic independence, it did not 




A weak correlation between economic and social/political empowerment was also 
demonstrated in Weber and Admad (2014) study of microfinance clients in Pakistan. They found 
that micro-lending did have a positive and significant impact on financial aspect of 
empowerment, but not in social sphere. However, women’s physical mobility regarding their 
ability to go out without any restriction was improved after participating in microfinance 
programs. This lack of evidence about a subsequent social empowerment, as well as a likelihood 
of higher burden on family’s contribution mentioned previously suggest that microfinance alone 
could not entirely alter the cultural norms and husbands’ attitude toward household gender role 
division (Ackerly, 1995; Goetz & Gupta, 1996; Hashemi et al., 1996). Without a parallel 
intervention to address gender relations, it is ambitious and unrealistic to expect that credit 
programs would improve clients’ every aspect of life after only several years of membership.  
Apart from outcome dimension, some efforts have been carried out to focus directly on 
the gender labor division and the allocation of the loans within the households (agency domain), 
as the outcome approach discussed above are being criticized for not capturing intra-household 
dynamics that affects the loan utilization process (Ackerly, 1995; Garikipati, 2013; Goetz & 
Gupta, 1996; Kabeer, 1999; Kabeer, 2005). In other words, measuring outcome only fulfills the 
question of what has gone right or wrong, but it cannot answer why it turns out to be the case. 
For instance, women’s increased participation in income-generating income does not always 
translate to an improvement in economic independence, since they could have been forced to 
find waged job to repay the loans (Garikipati, 2013). Moreover, shifting an attention to 
household relations and loan control could avoid errors coming from respondents’ estimation of 




transaction over a year while their numeracy skills and accounting knowledge are insufficient 
(Goetz & Gupta, 1996). 
Goetz and Gupta (1996) built a loan control index based on level of loan use and 
procurement for borrowers of Grameen Bank (GB), BRAC, and RD-12. The index ranged from 
“No involvement”, in which the entire loan amount was transfer to men and women did not have 
any managerial management on the productive process, to “Very limited”, “Partial”, 
“Significant”, and “Full” control on the loan allocation process. It was found that borrowers from 
the most minimalist program, GB, however exhibited the highest degree of loan control than the 
other two MFIs. Only 10% of GB’s clients fell into “No involvement” or “Very limited” 
category, while 45% and 56% of women from BRAC and RD-12 belonged to these categories 
respectively (p.60). This finding was later corroborated by Hashemi et al. (1996) as well. Goetz 
and Gupta (1996) also proposed that women tended to exert greater control on lower loans which 
were then invested in “woman’s assets” such as livestock, vegetable, or animal products. When 
the loan got larger, it was likely to transfer to more masculine activities that could yield higher 
returns such as petty trading or rickshaw pulling.   
This pattern of loan transfer from women’ to men’s hands was also observed by 
Garikipati (2013) and Ackerly (1995). However, they suggested an ambiguous nature of this 
behavior since it did not always signify that the husbands appropriate all the loans from their 
wives. Rather, giving some money to husbands might indicate women’s strategy to preserve 
marriage and family’s harmony, in exchange for a continued membership in microfinance 
programs. Moreover, women could have voluntarily handed over the money to their husbands as 
they perceived themselves as inexperienced and they are not confident in themselves. Goetz and 




productive asset”, such as a rickshaw, if she had a legal claim on that rickshaw, then she still 
retained some control over the asset. However, they were concerned about the nature of 
microloan that insisted on the financial inclusion for women only, as it could raise possibility of 
women being treated as a new source of money by her family.  
Apart from loan control assessment, a study of Dineen and Le (2015) evaluated the 
agency dimension of empowerment by asking women questions regarding their sense of self-
worth. All of them were qualitative statements such as “Women should do all household chores 
even if their spouse is nor working”, or “Women should discussion domestic violence issues 
with people who are not family members” (p.33). The survey was carried out on the PeaceTrees’ 
microfinance program in Vietnam, and the interviewees were asked to rate each item on 5-point 
scale: 1 as being “unimportant” and 5 as “extremely important”. The author found that the 
respondents were more conscious about their self-worth as well as their rights and 
responsibilities after 4 years in the program, except the statement regarding household chores 
mentioned above. After 4 years, the respondents placed more emphasis on their responsibility of 
entire household chores, implying that women’s perception of household gender roles remained 
the same, even somewhat more intensified than before. This result was consistent with the 
discussion of the findings from Sahu (2015) and Weber and Admad (2014) which stated that the 
status quo of gender stereotypes within household might not have been challenged by simply 
participating in microfinance program alone. 
2.4. Selection bias in choosing control group 
It has been noted in the last section that previous studies tend to choose nonmembers 
residing in the same villages as a control group, and these studies have advocated that by random 




Malyadri, 2015) compared to the treatment cohort. However, unless villagers are randomly 
assigned to receive a treatment (credit program), the goal of similar socioeconomic 
characteristics would never be achieved. According to Karlan (2001), women who decide to join 
an MFI are likely to be more empowered at the beginning than those who do not, as they already 
have some business ideas, or “entrepreneurial spirit” in mind. Thus, stratified random selection 
alone could not net out this intrinsic characteristic and the result is likely to overestimate the 
impact of microfinance programs on women’s empowerment.  
Another selection method employed by some studies is to use incoming clients or those 
who only have one loan cycle as a control group, as this approach is believed to overcome the 
“entrepreneurial spirit” bias mentioned above. However, they did not take into account clients 
who have dropped out although omitting this group would either underestimate or overestimate 
the true impact of the program. If that MFI fails to generate any benefit for some borrowers and 
hence they decide to leave the program, then focusing on existing clients alone would inflate its 
success. On the other hand, if some borrowers are made better off by the loans and can sustain by 
themselves, then ignoring these women would cause the estimate result look less optimistic 
Although the dropout group has already been included, there is still another issue related 
to the selection bias. In other words, even when having controlled for the participants’ age, 
education, marital status, and income level to name but a few, some intrinsic attributes still 
persist and could not be eliminated by relying on the in-training group alone. According to 
Karlan (2001, p.5-6), these missing characteristics are “timing of decision problem”, “peer-
selection problem”, and institutional /regulatory changes.  
The problem of decision timing arises from the fact that not every woman living in the 




different explanation for this decision, and those reasons are equally important. For instance, if 
one decides not to participate earlier due to her family member’s bad health that kept her busy in 
taking care of that person, then it is instead good health that deserves credit for improving her 
life, rather than microfinance. “Peer-selection problem” refers to MFIs’ inclination to serve 
wealthier segment of clients, dipping its toe in the water before advancing to poorer customers. 
Thus, the first batch is already wealthier than the second one, which is wealthier than the third 
one, and so on. The direction of bias could also be reverse, in which poorest women join first as 
they have nothing to lose and would not hesitate to take risk.  
The last type of bias, institutional/regulatory changes, refers to vibrant dynamics of 
surrounding regions as well as a health of the economy. A new MFI tends to start with a better 
off community, then stretch out to poorer regions. Also, its credit requirements alter continuously 
in response to the macro picture of the economy. A recession could prompt a MFI to be either 
more lenient or stricter in accepting poorer (and riskier) customers. If it decides to crowd out the 
poorest, then the women joining during that time are likely to be better off than those who 
participate during normal time. As it can be seen, targeting dropout clients in addition to in-
training group is not sufficient to overcome every type of selection bias and it is impossible to 
track down all noises at once   
3.  METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Data collection and survey 
In this study, I will attempt to determine the degree of empowerment based on the 
achievement dimension; that is, a change in a borrower’s economic power, her ability to make a 
major decision in household level, and her involvement in community activities. The data is 




three regulated MFIs in Vietnam and a part of VWU. The survey is a collaboration between 
TYM and CARD Research Unit based in Philippines. From TYM’s 24,000 clients and 19 
branches in northern Vietnam, 544 women in 8 different branches were selected using a stratified 
random sampling method. The respondents were divided into three main groups based on their 
duration in the program: Incoming clients (60 borrowers), New clients (120 borrowers), and 
Mature clients (364 borrowers). The Mature client cohort was further classified into three 
subgroups: 3 to less than 6 years, 6 to less than 9 years, and more than 9 years. Each subgroup 
comprised of approximately 120 borrowers.  
It is noted that AIMS/SEEP tool tends to use the in-training clients, who have not 
received any loans, as a control group for the impact assessment study to overcome the 
“entrepreneurial spirit” bias. However, as it has been presented in Section 2.4, choosing in-
training borrowers while omitting dropout group still results in a misleading interpretation. 
However, notwithstanding the limitation in experiment design, comparing the well-being 
between mature clients and in-coming clients is still useful to identify part of the complete 
picture of the program’s impact. 
Based on the reviewed literature, women empowerment will be determined by three 
elements: (a) economic security; (b) household major decision, and (c) community involvement 
(see also Sazali et al., 2014; Weber & Ahmad, 2014; Hashemi et al., 1996; Santillan et al., 2004; 
Malyadri & Sujatha, 2015; Sahu, 2015). Several questions in the AIMS/SEEP survey would be 
taken out to construct the indices. 
3.2. Constructing empowerment dimensions 




The motivation behind this dimension is to investigate to what extent a woman is 
financially independent from her husband or a male relative. This is reflected in whether (i) she 
has a personal saving apart from the enterprise’s profit, (ii) has her own income, and (iii) has a 
legal claim over an asset in her house. Her savings could be used either for making large 
purchase and reinvesting in the business, or preparing for emergencies so that she would not 
have to rush for a new loan in case of unexpected events. Since the survey only considered asset 
possession of entire household, item (iii) will be left out from the analysis. For item (ii), the 
question “Do you pay yourself a wage for your work in your enterprise” will be used as a close 
implication for one’s own income. However, an obscure interpretation of this question is also 
realized, as there is a blur boundary between one’s enterprise and household activities in the 
informal sector in which most microfinance borrowers earn their livings. The notion of “profit” 
and “salary” could be vaguely differentiated and the term “salary” might be even foreign to some 
respondents (Dimova & Joshi, 2016, p.12). Also, it is unlikely that households would have a 
fixed allocation of business income after covering its expenses. Instead, they disburse the cash 
based on a “as-needed basis” (p.12), spending more resources on more urgent needs of the 
household.   
As some limitations of the survey questions are being admitted, the economic security 
dimension will be defined by three items: 
• ES 1: She pay herself a wage for her work in her enterprise. 
• ES 2: She has a personal cash saving in case of emergencies or unexpected occasions. 
• ES 3: She has a personal cash saving for a major purchase or investment. 
In item ES 1, as I have mentioned in the previous paragraph that there could be a 




Economics Security index should be interpreted with caution. To quantify the ES dimension, one 
point will be assigned if a respondent fulfills each requirement. The maximum point for ES one 
could possibly get is 3 and minimum is 0. The cutoff point is determined based on an average 
value (Sahu, 2015), in this case is 2. If one scores 2 points or more, she will be classified as 
“empowered” and coded 1; otherwise, she is coded 0.  
It is important to realize that personal cash savings do not fully reflect the degree of 
security one possess, since savings could be any physical or productive assets such as gold, 
jewels, cattle, or land which are highly preferred by microfinance clients as their safety net. 
Omitting these savings possibilities would cause an analysis to miss a large piece of economic 
security’s overall picture. The AIMS survey also has a section related to nonmonetary savings, 
but since it only measures assets possession at household level instead of individual level, this 
section could not be incorporated into the index. This focus on aggregate well-being does not 
indicate there is a flaw in the survey, as its intention is not to test whether a microfinance 
program improves its clients’ empowerment alone but rather to determine whether the clients 
and their family are better off after joining the program. Thus, a separate, individual-focused 
survey should be designed to capture the picture better. However, notwithstanding the omitted 
data, personal cash savings would still be a useful indicator of economic security as cash is a 
vital source of liquidity among the poor, and it is less likely to be appropriated or stolen by other 
family members when being stored in TYM or in any informal saving groups (ROSCAs). 
3.2.2. Household Major Decision (HMD) 
Under a Confucian society, Vietnamese women face a gender stereotype that dictates her 
role in household and what kind of decision-making process she can participate in. Women are 




housework (Santillan et al., 2004, p.541). Men are the family’s breadwinners and are the ones 
who finalize important decisions. Although the government and VWU have constantly promoted 
gender equity since the country economic reform in 1986, it could be seen that while people are 
conforming to the party’s ideology, they still hold some patriarchal views regarding gender roles 
and responsibility. A person could believe “husband and wife are equal”, but at the same time 
“the wife has to listen to the husband and must not overstep him” (p.543).  
In this dimension, three questions about a woman’s ability to make major decision would 
be incorporated: 
• HMD 1: She decided to make large purchase (jointly with husband or individually) 
during the last 12 months. This includes major tools such as equipment, stoves, 
machinery and her own mean of transportation such as bicycle or motorbike. 
• HMD 2: She decided to invest in her enterprise (jointly with husband or individually) 
during the last 12 months (rent/expanding storage structure, upgrading marketing site) 
• HMD 3: She decided to make an improvement for her home (jointly with husband or 
individually) during the last 2 years.  
o HMD 3.1: She used the money earned by her business to make an improvement. 
Since the survey does not take a further step in asking whether she makes these decisions 
by herself or with her husband, the dimension could not fully capture her role in each case. 
However, the question “Who is the principal decision-maker in household?” would be 
incorporated in this index as it could partially reflect the relational power she possesses in 
household in general, although it does not guarantee that she would be granted freedom to 
finalize the decisions in all situations mentioned above. Also, it is likely that each respondent 




could have had the same experience. For example, one might describe a decision to send her 
child for a vaccination as an autonomous action while other might consider it as a mere 
compliance to a local health campaign (Santillan et al., 2004). Thus, similar to an ambiguous 
nature of the distinction between “profit” and “salary” mentioned in previous section, it is hard to 
justify whether a person truly exhibits certain degree of power over a household’s decision-
making process or not. However, notwithstanding such limitation, this question is still a crucial 
criterion to distinguish those women who seem to have some relatively authority as opposed 
from those who do not. Thus, a fourth item for this HDM dimension would be as followed:     
• HMD 4: She is the principal decision-maker in the family, both enterprise-related or 
household-related issues. 
Since HMD 4 provides us further information about one’s freedom in deciding 
household’s decision-making process, I will place more weight for this item if a woman reports 
that she is a household principal decision-maker. So, two points will be assigned for HMD 4, and 
one point is assigned for each of the other requirements. The cutoff point is determined based on 
an average value, which is 3. Thus, a respondent will be coded 1 of her point is at least 3; 
otherwise, she is coded 0. The possible maximum point is 6 and minimum is 0.  
3.2.3. Community Involvement (CI) 
The last element examines women’s sphere of influence beyond a household level and 
how actively she has committed to community activities. One point is given if she has done one 
of the following activities: (i) generating employment for others by hiring them for her business, 
(ii) sponsoring in a community event, or (iii) being promoted to a leadership role in a community 




activities, performance, road cleaning, and projects launched for the disabled” (TYM, 2007, 
p.33). It is assumed that when a woman is freed up from budget constrained and a burden of 
excessive housework, she would be more willing to spend some of her time and resources 
(money) to get engaged in community activities as this sense of social inclusion could grant her 
confidence and respect from other women. In this dimension, the possible point one could get is 
only 1 or 0, that is, socially engaged or not socially engaged.  
It should be noted that Community Involvement is a very broad dimension, and its 
specification is dependent on a country/region’s environment we are working. One might 
concern that the criteria mentioned above for this dimension are quite strict and narrow, and thus 
would suggest a more lenient criterion such as gaining membership in rural cooperative or 
farmer association. However, while such relaxed restriction could work well in other countries, 
this membership-based classification is unlikely to reveal further information in the case of 
Vietnam, as every woman who wants to join TYM (or any particular microcredit program) must 
be a member of the Vietnam Women’s Union (VWU). In other words, membership in VWU is a 
condition for a membership of a microfinance program and many people do not find a need to 
actively participate in union’s discussion after joining the group. 
  As earning membership is not sufficient to determine the level of participation, there 
should be other proxy to measure the degree of involvement at community level. When 
developing indicator of women’s empowerment in Vietnam, Santillan et al. (2004) also 
mentioned this country-specific feature and suggested an alternative measurement that could 
account for a more active engagement of women in community sphere such as participating in 
various events or leading a regional women’s union. Thus, in order to broadly capture the extent 




above as criteria for one’s active participation in the social sphere. These activities not only tell 
that a woman is now a part of a broader circle rather than her family, but also demonstrates that 
she is willing to take initiation by being a leader, donating money to community events, or 
generating employment for others. Here, leadership does not imply that one should lead a formal 
group such as regional women’s union or women board in order to be classified as a “leader”; 
instead, the scope could be as small as leading an inspection center, TYM’s center, or even a 
performance group for a singing contest. The data is already available in the survey, and I will 
extract the survey’s related questions to construct this dimension’s index.    
3.2.4. Composite Index 
Composite Index is the sum of the three dimensions discussed above, which could 
possible range from 0 to 10 points. The cutoff point, which is 4, is also determined by an average 
value and a respondent is coded 1 if she scores 4 or more; otherwise, she would get 0. It is noted 
that all raw points would be converted into binary value (0 or 1) in order to be consistent with the 
data type of Community Involvement Index (categorical).  
3.3. Hypotheses 
To answer the research questions delineated in the Introduction Section, I will test two 
following hypotheses:  
- H1: Women in microfinance program are more likely to be empowered in all dimensions 
than non-members. 





For both hypotheses, I employ the logistic regression model proposed by Hashemi et al. 
(1996) and Sahu (2015) to assess an impact of membership and membership duration on 
empowerment. To test the first hypothesis, I use the dummy variable Borrower, which is coded 1 
when a woman was a TYM Funds’ member and 0 if otherwise. Here, I treat in-training members 
as non-members since they had just joined the credit program and did not receive any loan yet. 
For the second hypothesis, since we want to measure the effect of membership duration on 
client’s empowerment, I will exclude the in-training group from the regression and I only 
consider new clients and mature clients, those who had received loans (treatment) by the time of 
the survey already.  
3.4. Variables specification 
This section lists out the specification of all variables’ names that I use in the regression 
equation: 
MS: Marital status of a respondent (MS=1 if married, 0 otherwise) 
OL: The occupation level of respondents which is coded 1 if she is engaged in non-agricultural 
activities or she has her own enterprise, and 0 if otherwise 
RI: Number of household members earning regular income, which is coded 1 if there are more 
than 1 person in a family and 0 if otherwise  
Borrower: Dummy variable (Borrower = 1 for members, 0 otherwise) 
Type(3-6), Type(6-9), Type(>9): Dummy variables which is code 1 if she is in the program for 
either 3-6 years, 6-9 years, or more than 9 years respectively. The reference group is 0-6 months 




Age(31-40), Age(41-50), Age(>50): Dummy variables which takes value 1 if her age is within 
the range denoted in the parentheses and 0 if otherwise. The reference group is Less than 31 
years old. 
Edu(Primary), Edu(Secondary), Edu(High school): Dummy variables which is coded 1 if she has 
an education level denoted in the parentheses and 0 if otherwise. The reference group is No 
school. 
3.5. Logistic regression model 
Let EI1, EI2, EI3 and EI4 denote the empowerment indices delineated in previous sections, 
which are Economic Security, Household Major Decision, Community Involvement, and 
Composite Index respectively. EI’s are binary variables, that is: 
𝐸𝐼𝑗 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑎 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑖𝑠 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
, for j = 1,2,3,4 





where X is a vector of independent variables, β is a vector of unknown parameters and ε is an 
error term.  Let the condition probability of 𝐸𝐼𝑗  denoted by E(𝐸𝐼𝑗)= 𝑃(𝐸𝐼𝑗 = 1|𝑋), we would 
yield the logistic response function: 




The function can be linearized into the logit transformation of the probability 𝑃(𝐸𝐼𝑗 =






1 − 𝑃(𝐸𝐼𝑗 = 1|𝑋)
) = 𝑋𝛽 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1 + 𝛽2𝑋2+. . . +𝛽k𝑋𝑘 
whereas 𝑋1, 𝑋2, . . . , 𝑋𝑘 are the set of independent variables.  
For the test of our first hypothesis, the model would be as followed: 
𝑙𝑛 (
𝑃(𝐸𝐼𝑗 = 1|𝑋)
1 − 𝑃(𝐸𝐼𝑗 = 1|𝑋)
) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑆 + 𝛽3𝑂𝐿 + 𝛽4𝑅𝐼 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑔𝑒(31 − 40) + 𝛽6𝐴𝑔𝑒(41 − 50)
+ 𝛽7𝐴𝑔𝑒(> 50) + 𝛽8𝐸𝑑𝑢(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦) + 𝛽9𝐸𝑑𝑢(𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦) + 𝛽10𝐸𝑑𝑢(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙) 
(1) 
For the second hypothesis, I replace the variable Borrower with dummy regressors which 




) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒(3 − 6) + 𝛽2𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒(6 − 9) + 𝛽3𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒(> 9) + 𝛽4𝑀𝑆 + 𝛽5𝑂𝐿 + 𝛽6𝑅𝐼 + 𝛽7𝐴𝑔𝑒(31 − 40) +
                                    𝛽8𝐴𝑔𝑒(41 − 50) + 𝛽9𝐴𝑔𝑒(> 50) + 𝛽10𝐸𝑑𝑢(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦) + 𝛽11𝐸𝑑𝑢(𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦) + 𝛽12𝐸𝑑𝑢(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙)  
(2) 
4.  DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY 
Table 1. Demographic summary of respondents 
  
In-training 0-6 months 3 years 6 years 9 years 
N of cases 
 
60 120 120 123 121 
Age 
      
 
Mean (years) 38.5 (9.4)* 40.3 (10.7) 40.5 (9.4) 44.7 (8.1) 47 (6.6)  
Observed range 18-55 21-63 23-61 27-68 32-64 
Number of 
children 
      
 
Mean 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.5 0.9  
Observed range 0-5 0-7 0-5 0-5 0-3 
Household 
size 
      
 
Mean 4.6 4.2 4.6 5.1 4.2  










Mean 0.8 0.3 0.7 1 1.2  
Observed range 0-4 0-2 0-7 0-5 0-6        
Marital 
status 
      
        
Married 94% 90% 94% 89% 84%  
Separated/Divorced 2% 0% 3% 2% 7%  
Widowed 2% 7% 2% 9% 6%  
Single 2% 3% 1% 0% 3% 
Education 
      
 
No school 3% 5% 3% 6% 2%  
Primary 7% 13% 14% 41% 11%  
Secondary 67% 58% 67% 50% 72%  

















Note: *Standard deviation 
Table 1 summarizes the demographic characteristics among the three groups; in-training, 
young, and mature borrowers. The age range is 18 to 68 years old, and the mean age increases 
when moving from the incoming group to 9-year group. The number of children could vary from 
no child up to 7 children in the case of 6-month group, while a household could have 14 
members living under the same roof. On average, mature borrowers have higher number of 
children and household size than the other two cohorts; however, these figures are noticeably 
smaller in 9-year borrowers’ household compared to the rest. Their family on average have more 
members who earn regular income despite smaller size. This figure could be as high as 7 
members in one’s household or could be none of them having regular income, indicating that 
seasonal income-generating activities such as agriculture still account for a great portion of one’s 
life although she has committed to the program for several years. In general, new cohort of 
borrowers tends to be more engaged in non-agricultural activities than older groups, in which 
more than half of the women in 6-month group have committed in these activities while only 




It could be seen that most of the women are married and literate, although the proportion 
of married women gradually decreases when moving up to more mature group. A majority of 
clients have a secondary level of education, and young and incoming borrowers are likely to 
achieve high school level, that 24% and 23% of the respondents have completed 10th grade or 
higher respectively. This high education level is not abnormal since Vietnam’s national literary 
rate among women is 92.3%, much higher than its neighboring countries such as Cambodia or 
Laos (TYM, 2007, p.16). 
Table 2. Percentage of women who are considered “empowered” in terms of each 
empowerment dimension 
% of borrowers who are empowered in In-training 0-6 month 3 years 6 years 9 years 
Economic security 23% 37% 46% 48% 53% 
Household major decision 18% 27% 40% 47% 39% 
Community involvement 25% 22% 33% 56% 56% 
Composite index 27% 42% 60% 65% 67% 
 
Table 2 shows the percentage of women who are coded “empowered” for each 
dimension. It could be seen that in general, the proportion of empowered women among mature 
borrowers (ie. 3-year, 6-year, and 9-year clients) is significantly higher than the in-training and 
0-6 months members, while there is little difference between the subgroups within the mature 
client cohort. It is noted that 6-month group performs better than in-training group in every 
dimension, except Community Involvement. The percentages of women who are coded 
“empowered” are relatively similar for the two cohorts. In this case, it might be due to the fact 
that it requires time for a person to move from domestic sphere to community sphere and gain 
more social capital. In other words, receiving credits from an MFI does not directly imply that a 
borrow will be immediately more active and engaged in community activities. In order to 




that she could be then willing to free up some of her time to get involved in social gathering. 
Thus, there might be little difference between the degree of empowerment in terms of 
Community Involvement dimension between in-training and 6-month borrowers.      
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1. Membership and women’s empowerment 
Table 3. Logistic results of the effect of membership on the empowerment dimensions, 
controlled for marital status. Occupation, age, education, and number of household members 























Membership 3.243 <0.001*** 2.283 0.024* 2.108 0.021* 3.814 <0.001*** 






1.044 0.816 2.027 <0.001*** 1.343 0.116 1.786 0.003** 
Number of household 
members having 
regular income 
1.344 <0.001*** 1.140 0.147 1.204 0.033* 1.550 <0.001*** 
Age group         
Less than 31 years (1)         
31-40 0.889 0.705 2.239 0.043* 2.828 0.004** 1.900 0.047* 
41-50 0.624 0.115 3.341 0.002** 3.336 <0.001*** 1.856 0.046* 
More than 50 years 0.773 0.433 3.909 <0.001*** 2.475 0.016* 2.454 0.009** 
 
Education level 
        
No school (1)         
Primary 0.681 0.438 2.263 0.129 1.321 0.591 0.924 0.880 
Secondary 0.838 0.701 1.058 0.911 1.349 0.541 0.708 0.485 
High school 1.338 0.562 1.864 0.258 1.929 0.215 1.208 0.726 
         
*significant at 5%, **significant at 1%, ***significant at 0.1% 
(1) control group  
I first run the regression for equation (1) in Section 3.5 to test for the first hypothesis that 




results after running logistic regression controlled for marital status, occupation, age, education, 
and number of household members earning regular income. Here, in-training members are 
treated as the control group since they still receive no loans from TYM, which means that no 
treatment is being applied onto this group yet. The treatment group will be those who have 
already received at least one loan and consists of both young and mature members. 
It can be seen that a participation in TYM has a statistically significant and positive 
impact on every empowerment dimension. Specifically, holding other factors constant, TYM’s 
members are more than 2 times as empowered as without-loan members in terms of household 
major decision and community involvement dimension (the odds ratio is 2.28 and 2.11 
respectively), and the coefficient estimates are significant at 0.05 level. Membership has the 
largest impact on economic security, which has the odd ratio as 3.24, implying that the odds for 
being empowered for TYM’s members is more than 3 times greater than that of in-training 
members, and the result is significant at 0.001 level. Overall, regarding the composite index, it is 
found that the odds ratio for this item is 3.81 and the estimate is significant at 0.001 level. This 
means that in general, TYM’s borrowers are nearly 4 times as more likely to be empowered than 
in-training borrowers, holding everything else constant.  
One factor that seems to significantly contribute to empowerment significant is the 
number of household members who earn regular income. The odds ratio for this variable is 
greater than 1 for every dimension, suggesting that the greater the number of family members 
having regular income, the more likely a woman appreares to be “empowered”. Indeed, having 
more steady income stream from other family members could partially contribute to higher 
scores of empowerment indices, as this additional economic security derived from household 




community activities. Table 4 presents the percentage of women who are coded “empowered” 
(in terms of the Composite Index) based on the number of family members having regular 
income. It can be seen that 39% of the women in family with zero member earning salary are 
considered empowered in contrast to 67% of those in household with three members or more 
having regular income. When breaking down further the number, clearly, most of women in 
family having at least four members earning regular income are coded “empowered” (see Table 
5). This stark increase in empowerment percentage implies that number of household members 
with regular income indeed greatly contributes to the outcome of empowerment indices’s 
computation, and it is appropriate to control for this factor when performing the regression 
analysis as an exclusion would overestimate the odds ratio and lead to biased intepretation. 
Table 4. Percentage of borrowers who are considered “empowered” in terms of 
Composite Index, based on number household members who have regular income 
  0 1 2 >=3 
% of borrowers who are empowered in 
composite index 39% 50% 66% 67% 
 
Table 5. A breakdown of the number of borrowers who are considered “empowered” 
based on number household members who have regular income 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Number of 
women who are Not empowered 170 79 26 7 4 0 0 0 
 Empowered 107 79 50 11 5 4 1 1 
 
Another factor that I expect to have an important contribution to the computation of 
empowerment scores is the type of occupation, which in this exercise is whether a respondent is 
getting involved in non-agricultural activities or having her own enterprise. It is hypothesized 
that women who are engaging in such activities are more likely to be empowered than those who 




and generates more economic security. Also, they are more willing to spend time socializing as 
budget constraint is no more a burden. The odds ratios in Logistic results from Table 3 
corroborate this hypothesis, although the level of significance differs for each dimension. For 
example, women engaging in non-agricultural activities are significantly more empowered than 
those who do not in terms of HMD dimension and Composite Index, while there is not sufficient 
evidence to indicate that there is a difference among ES and CI dimension. It is quite surprising 
that the regression does not yield a significant result for the economic security index, and the 
odds ratio for this item is meagre (1.044). Although it is likely that those who get involved in 
agricultural activities tend to subject to seasonal and climatic patterns, which would therefore 
reduce the degree of certainty and crop security, the ES’s odds ratio however seems not to reflect 
this fact. This could be due to my construction of the ES index that only consider personal 
savings and personal wages, which then could not fully capture the seasonality of agricultural 
activities. Since I do not have enough data to expand the criteria for ES dimension, some further 
works to refine this index would be required in the future.      
One interesting remark from the estimation is that married women appear to be less 
empowered in all dimensions compared to the rest (ie. those who are divorced, widowed, or 
single). The odds ratio is especially very significant for HMDD dimension (p-value is <0.001) 
and its estimate of 0.3 indicates that married women are 70% less likely to be empowered than 
the comparison group. It seems that marital status has the most negative impact on household 
decision-making dimension, which is quite understandable since without a presence of her 
husband, a woman is supposed to lead the family herself and be able to exercise greater influence 




To examine the figures more carefully, Table 6 shows the number of women who are 
principal decision makers in the family with respect to their marital status. It can be seen that for 
those who are divorced, widowed, or single, most of them (80%) are reported to be the family’s 
principal decision makers. Also, all divorced women are remarkably believed to be the 
household’s leader, which suggests that if there is an absence of the husband, these women are 
assumed to lead their family without channeling this role to their sons (if applicable) or to their 
male relatives. If this inference does generate some merits, then Vietnamese women are 
somewhat more empowered and independent from men’s influence over the control of 
household’s resources compared to women in South Asian countries such as Bangladesh or 
India. As Goetz & Gupta (1996) has shown, if there is an absence of a husband, Bangladeshi 
women are still subject to the supervision of their male relatives who would be therefore 
responsible for the allocation of household’s resources and the finalization of family’s decisions.  
Table 6. Number of women who are principal decision makers based on their marital 
status 
Marital Status Married Separate/Divorced Widowed Single 
Principal decision makers    
 Yes 131 16 25 3 
 No 355 0 4 7 
 
It should be noted that as Table 6 shows, divorced women are the only group in which all 
of them gain control over household’s decision-making process. The percentage among widowed 
respondents is also very high (86%), but only 30% of single women are reported to be the major 
decision makers. This could be due to the possibility that single women tend to be young, and 
thus they are still living with their parents who are leading the family at that moment. Otherwise, 




that divorced women appear to be more independent and “empowered” than the latter, and one 
possible explanation is that Vietnamese women are responsible to preserve her family’s harmony 
and her marriage even though she has been badly treated by a husband (Schuler et al., 2006, 
p.390), and having no male household head (and no father if she has children) remains a taboo 
that she is likely to be subject to gossip and badmouth. Thus, coming to a divorce settlement 
would be viewed as a great milestone of one’s life, as she is willing to take up any anticipated 
hardships in either financial or social sphere. In that case, it is appropriate to consider a divorced 
woman “empowered” in terms of her sense of agency, as she is able to defy her assumed 
responsibility to be tolerant to domestic inequality while acknowledging any disadvantages lying 
ahead. However, this explanation only serves as a conjecture for high percentage of divorced 
women who are empowered since there are many reasons that initiate an end to a marriage, and 
not all of them are voluntary or could manifest a woman’s gain of economic independence. 
Moreover, since the sample size of divorced/widowed/single women in my dataset is limited, it 
might be the case that these women do not represent the true characteristics of the population, 
and it is interesting to study their coping mechanism after an unfortunate incident such as divorce 
and how they reallocate household’s resources to response to these shocks onward. I will leave 
this question to future research.  
Another interesting, yet confusing result is that not only married women are less likely to 
be empowered than the comparison group in terms of HMD dimension, they also perform worse 
in the ES item where the presence of a husband and thus “masculine jobs” is believed to generate 
more financial outcome (Goetz and Gupta, 1996). While it is true that those women would gain 
control on household issues, they could not carry out such “men’s work” such as petty trading, 




and higher degree of competitiveness, which is however more compatible to men, but they would 
consequently yield higher financial returns compared to “women’s work” such as livestock 
rearing or paddy husking (Goetz and Gupta, 1996). A higher economic empowerment among 
unmarried women would thus trigger a confusion. However, it should be noted that the ES 
dimension only determine whether one has her own savings and if she pays herself a wage; it 
does not measure her family’s wealth or overall income. A higher ES score could be ascribed to 
her awareness of uncertain future ahead without her husband, hence she is likely to be more 
attentive to cash savings accumulation as a coping mechanism against any future misfortune.  
The last two variables that I will discuss are age and education level of the respondents, 
whose results are presented in the last two rows in Table 3. It seems that education is unlikely to 
play an important role in the determination of empowerment, as there is not any clear trend 
among the odds ratios and none of the p-values is significant at 0.05 level. In terms of age, it can 
be seen that this variable significantly improves the level of empowerment in every dimension 
except for the ES index, which might signal that seniority is likely to play a role in enhancing 
women’s power.  One factor might contribute to the positive relationship between seniority and 
empowerment is that some women with married son would become mother-in-law and thus be 
able to exert greater influence on the family, the power that they used to be subjected to in the 
past. This gain of control would be then not attributed to microfinance’s impact since it happens 
in cultural context regardless whether there has been any contribution from the credit program. 
Another cultural factor that might explain this relationship is that since Vietnamese households 
tend to consist of several generation that could raise the number of household members to more 




family (such as cooking and cleaning) to young members, freeing themselves from these burdens 
and being able to venture outside more often. 
It is interesting to see that the odds ratios for ES index in terms of age are all less than 1, 
which indicates that those who are older than 30 years old would be less likely to be 
economically secured compared to the comparison group (ie. women who are less than 30 years 
old). However, the coefficient estimates for this dimension are not significant at 0.05 level. This 
result is rather counterintuitive, as older women are more likely to join TYM earlier and graduate 
into mature clients, which should suggest that they are more empowered than younger members. 
One possible explanation is that there is a limitation in the construction of ES dimension, which 
leads to the index’s inability to capture varied aspect of women’s economic security. As I have 
discussed in Section 3.2.1, since the criteria for respondents’ personal savings only consider cash 
savings without further reference to non-monetary savings such as gold or jewelry, and since 
TYM’s survey does not concern such non-monetary savings, the ES index could not incorporate 
this importation information into its computation. As older women are prone to storing their 
wealth through gold or jewelry compared to the young cohort, who would prefer to keep their 
money in a bank account, the failure to take account of this fact would underestimate the level of 
economic security among the elders. In Table 7, I decompose the ES index into separate 
components and calculate the percentage of women who satisfy each criterion’s requirement 
based on their age group. As it shows, the percentages of the respondents who have their 
personal cash savings for future investments or emergencies are lower for those who are more 
than 40 years old compared to younger cohorts, suggesting that they might have had another 





Table 7. Percentage of women satisfying each component of the ES index based on their 
age group 
Age group   
Less 
than 31 




% of women who satisfy that:     
 She has personal savings for emergencies  83% 73% 72% 66% 
 She has personal savings for future investment 39% 42% 36% 39% 
 She pays herself own wages 20% 18% 17% 28% 
 
5.2. Membership duration and women’s empowerment 
Table 8. Logistic results of the effect of membership duration on the empowerment 
dimensions, controlled for marital status, occupation, age, education, and number of household 























Duration in the 
program  
       
 
 
0-6 months (1) 
        
3 years 1.504 0.141 2.104 0.015* 1.799 0.057 2.287 0.004** 
6 years 1.859 0.038* 2.150 0.017* 5.116 <0.001*** 2.174 0.012* 
























1.059 0.768 2.118 <0.001*** 1.669 0.015* 1.870 0.003** 
 
Number of household 
members having 
regular income 
1.265 0.014* 1.093 0.364 1.073 0.460 1.502 <0.001*** 
 
Age group 
       
 
Less than 31 years (1)        
 
31-40 0.799 0.511 2.054 0.094 2.287 0.048* 1.862 0.084 
41-50 0.507 0.044* 3.166 0.006** 2.648 0.017* 1.803 0.093 
More than 50 years 0.599 0.161 3.677 0.004** 1.777 0.192 2.346 0.028* 
 
Education level 
        
No school (1)         
Primary 0.548 0.246 2.468 0.111 1.266 0.679 0.739 0.592 
Secondary 0.696 0.459 1.258 0.670 1.593 0.391 0.565 0.282 
High school 1.151 0.793 2.240 0.171 2.767 0.086 1.122 0.844 
         




(1) control group 
As the previous section has shown that membership in a microfinance program does have 
a significantly positive impact on women’s empowerment in every dimension, this section will 
turn to the second hypothesis that the duration of membership also helps to improve the level of 
empowerment. In other words, as the clients stay longer in the program, they are more likely to 
be empowered than those who just join in recently. Table 8 presents the regression results from 
Equation (2) in Section 3.5. Here, I exclude in-training group and only consider those who have 
already received at least one loan from TYM, controlling for marital status, occupation, age, 
education, and the number of household member having regular income. The estimations for 
these controlled variables are similar to that of Section 5.1, so in this part, I will only focus on 
the impact of membership duration on the empowerment level.  
It can be seen that compared to 6-month cohort, mature clients are more likely to be 
empowered in all dimensions, but the magnitude of each groups does not appear to be linear. In 
other words, there is little evidence that the longer one stays in TYM, the more empowered she 
should become. The only dimension that follows such linear trend is ES, which 9-year borrowers 
has the highest odds ratio, which is 1.99. This means that compared to 6-month group, 9-year 
clients are almost twice as likely to be empowered when holding others constant. This 
straightforward relationship is not true anymore for other dimensions. Specifically, the estimates 
for HMD index tells that borrowers in 3-year and 6-year cohort are twice as likely to be 
empowered than the comparison group, while 9-year members are only 40% more empowered 
and the estimate is not even significant. However, 6-year and 9-year members are the most 
empowered in terms of CI index, which is reasonable since more mature clients tend to establish 




It is noted that the insignificant difference between 9-year and 6-month members 
regarding the HMD dimension does not mean that women cannot gain greater power over 
household decision-making process as they stay in the program for longer. Table 9 deconstructs 
the composition of the HMD index and calculates the percentage of women who satisfy each 
criterion’s requirement. It can be seen that the percentage of 9-year women who are principal 
decision makers (46%) appears to be the highest one among the groups, which indicates that 
mature borrowers do gain some relative power over domestic issues. They are also more likely to 
decide to invest further into their business during the last 12 months than the rest. However, the 
proportion of 9-year members who decide to make large purchases during the last 12 months is 
very low (35%), which is even lower than that of 6-month borrowers (39%). It might be due to 
the situation that their houses are already well-equipped and thus they do not feel a need to 
purchase anything else. This is not the best explanation as the timeframe for this criterion is a 
year, and it is hard to imagine one does not make any large purchase (such as stoves, equipment, 
or a bike) during that 12-month span.   
Table 9. Percentage of women satisfying each component of the HMD index based on 
their membership duration 
Membership duration 
In-
training 6-month 3-year 6-year 9-year 
% of women who satisfy that:     
 She is the principal decision maker 17% 23% 30% 38% 46% 
 She decides to make purchases 28% 39% 56% 52% 35% 
 She decides to invest in her business 3% 18% 13% 17% 18% 
 She decides to make an improvement for her house 53% 45% 52% 65% 58% 
 
Overall, the odds ratios for the Composite Index shows that mature clients are more than 
twice as likely to be empowered than young members, and the difference between these ratios’ 




positively correlated with the level of empowerment, and longer stay in TYM does not guarantee 
that one should be more empowered than younger members. One possible reason for this 
diminishing effect is that the loans/treatment would exert the greatest influence on women’s 
empowerment during the first years of membership, as it would act as a positive shock to one’s 
life. Thus, with a sudden exposure to a diverse set of resources from an MFI (ie. funds, human 
support, trainings), one would expect to see greater advancement in those first years, then this 
progress would be mediated when household’s income stream is being stabilized again.    
6. CONCLUSION 
The paper examines the effect of microfinance participation and membership duration on 
the degree of women’s empowerment with a case study in Vietnam. The MFI being studied in 
this exercise is the TYM Fund, which is the largest and most organized microfinance program in 
Vietnam, and the dataset used for the analysis is derived from the institution’s 2007 AIMS/SEEP 
Impact Assessment Survey conducted on its 544 clients. The paper constructs the empowerment 
index by building three dimensions: Economic Security, Household Major Decision, and 
Community Involvement. Composite Index is calculated by adding three sub-indices together to 
assess the overall level of empowerment among the borrowers. Logistic regression model is used 
in the exercise to measure the odds for being empowered, and the model is controlled by marital 
status, occupation, age, education, and number of household members earning regular income.  
Through the regression results, it is shown that the data supports the first hypothesis that 
participation in a microfinance program helps to improve the degree of empowerment, in which 
whose have already received one loan from TYM on average are two times more likely to be 
empowered in terms of household decision-making process and community involvement than in-




household members with regular income also positively contributes to the empowerment level, 
and this variable is indeed a significant, important factor in the determination of whether one is 
empowered or not. Marital status, on the other hand, has a negative relationship with the indices, 
that married women are less likely to be empowered in every dimension. However, since the 
sample size of unmarried women is quite small, it is not sure that whether this result could 
represent the population being studied or not. Further study should therefore be carried out to 
examine the behavior of divorced/widowed/single women in order to come to a more general 
solution. Also, it is found that education level does not affect the level of empowerment, and 
there is not a clear trend toward the effect of higher education on women’s empowerment.  
While the regression results corroborate the first hypothesis that membership does matter, 
there is however little evidence that membership duration is positively correlated with the degree 
of empowerment. It is true that members who stay in the program for more than 3 years are more 
likely to be empowered than those who recently join in, this effect does not necessarily extend to 
mature members who are in the program for 6 or 9 years. Although it does not guarantee that the 
level of empowerment will subsequently increase for an additional year of membership, it should 
be kept in mind that invention of microfinance tends to exert its highest effect during the first 
years of membership, then level off again in the subsequent years. Moreover, as the empirical 
evidence still suggests that women are more likely to be empowered after joining the program, 
we still believe that microfinance is indeed an effective tool to enhance women’s status, 
domestically and socially.  
It should be noted that my construction of the empowerment indices is still subject to 
several limitations that could confound the interpretation of the regression results. These 




popularity of non-monetary savings such as gold or jewelry among elder members, and the 
selection bias regarding the control group from the survey itself. The next and last section 
dedicates to the discussion of some caveats that I mentioned earlier in the methodology and 
results part.       
7. SUGGESTION FOR SURVEY IMPROVEMENT 
Since the paper’s analysis is based on a standardized AIMS survey which covers a larger 
scope of impact of a MFI on its clients’ well-being, we cannot expect the survey’s questions to 
be able to answer all the questions relating to one’s degree of empowerment. Some limitations 
mentioned above have shown that there should be a separate survey specifically designed to 
address different dimensions of empowerment alone. To reduce the selection bias, beside 
existing and dropout clients, a study could replace the in-training group with nonclients living in 
the same village as well as nonclients living in a comparable village that a program does not 
operate (Hashemi et al., 1996). Adding nonborrowers from different village could avoid the 
decision-timing bias and could address an issue of fungible loan (Hulme, 2000, p.85), in which 
the treatment group actively interacts with the control group and the loan (treatment) could leak 
out and be transferred from one group to another. Hence, the control cohort could be 
“contaminated” by having such contact with microfinance clients. Although it is a desirable 
outcome in long-term goal, but in the short run it would cause some noises and distort the result. 
It should be noted that finding a demographically “similar” village is nearly impossible and if 
there really exist two villages that possess some similarities, then there should be a microfinance 
program operating already. This problem could however be partially corrected if we control for 
relative wealth and geographic division along with other variables mentioned in Section 3. This 




permit, then having in-training clients as control cohort would be fine but those persisting 
selection bias should be recognized. 
It has been demonstrated that there are several limitations in the Economic Security 
dimension resulting from the way this survey was designed. Since it is inefficient to directly ask 
a client whether she pays herself a wage and it is likely that she does not understand the term 
“wage” at all, the wording should be altered to make it more comprehensible. We could ask her 
if she always sets aside a portion of her business income/money to make purchases for her own 
needs, and if her family members could all have access to the money from the business. A 
question related to asset ownership should also be incorporated, as it could represent the 
nonmonetary savings that she possesses. Such questions like “Do you have a legal claim on your 
land/house/motorbike?”, “Beside cash savings, what would you do if there is an unexpected 
crisis?”, and “Have any family members taken/sold your possession without your consent?” 
could capture how much control she has on household assets and her different types of savings 
apart from money.  
For Household Major Decision dimension, instead of having a general question regarding 
if a woman is a principal decision maker, one should consider asking this question for every 
activity that the survey lists out (major purchase, investment, house improvement) to make sure 
that her voice is heard in all aspects of household decision making process. It should be noted 
that these activities do not have to be determined solely by a woman, as it is unrealistic to 
assume that a husband would confer all rights to his wife and step down. A joint decision 
reached by an agreement between husband and wife should be already sufficient to grant her one 




wife manages to win a debate or it has been reached unanimously, not just merely offering 
solutions and being overwhelmed by a husband.  
Since this study only concentrates on the outcome perspective, it does not take into 
account how much control a woman has on the loans and how she perceives her self-worth or 
legal rights, which is indeed a crucial element in empowerment’s conceptual framework. Also, a 
consideration of one’s sense of community belonging is also worth of attention in future 
research, as it helps to recognize an extent to which a woman interacts with her surrounding 
community, villages, as well as a local government. However, since these aspects lie within the 
agency dimension, it is not a good idea to combine two dimensions (that is, outcome and agency) 
into one analysis as a vague term like “self-worth” or “sense of belonging” could not be easily 
quantified or represented as dummy variables (ie. 0 or 1). Another separate survey should be 
tailored with a different format but as it is out of scope of this analysis, the discussion would not 
delve further into this issue. Overall, although there are several limitations from the AIMS 
survey, it is still a useful source to investigate the impact of microfinance on women 
empowerment. As the regression analysis has shown that there is a significant difference 
between the incoming clients and mature clients, it is still appropriate to conclude that, with 
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